Spring 2007


 
 AREC 815: Experimental and Behavioral Economics
Spring 2007

Professor:Andreas Lange
Office:2116B Symons Hall
Hours:by appointment
Phone:(301) 405-1918
Email:alange@arec.umd.edu
Web page:http://www.arec.umd.edu/alange

Course Description

This course will provide the student with the necessary tools to be an avid consumer of the experimental and behavioral literature and eventually a producer of the literature.  It will provide a summary of recent experimental findings and details how to gather and analyze data using experimental methods.  In the field of behavioral economics, the class will discuss new developments in economic theory which has attempted to adjust standard neoclassical models in order to explain such observed experimental findings and behavioral patterns which commonly occur but are “paradoxical” for traditional models.

Class times:

  • Tue,Thu 11:00am – 12:15pm; Symons Hall 0115

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Topics

 I. Introduction to experimental and behavioral economics

 II. Experimental Methods and Topics

  • Experimental terminology, some common statistical methods, etc.
  • Controlling preferences with money; controlling risk posture

  • Experimenter effects; sample selection in the lab
  • Choice of experimental design

  • Markets (one-sided, two-sided auctions, collusion)
  • Public economics (linear games, charitable, wta/wtp/endowment effect, hypothetical bias) and simple public goods experiment

  • Social preferences (gift exchange, dictator, ultimatum) and simple gift exchange experiment
  • Field Experiments

     III. Behavioral Economics (Schedule see below)

    A. Other regarding preferences

    • Inequality aversion
    • Intention-based models

      B. Preferences over goods and gambles

      • Prospect Theory

      • Probability weighting
      • other alternatives to expected utility theory

        C. Preferences over time – discounting

        • Hyperbolic discounting

        • Time consistency







Tuesday April 3rd - April 10th

A. Other regarding preferences, social preferences

  • Thaler, Richard (1989) “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 195-206. LINK

  • Camerer, Colin and Richard Thaler, "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 1995, 209-219. LINK

Inequity-Aversion

  • Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868. LINK 

  • Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2000), “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,” American Economic Review 90, 166-193. LINK

  • Engelmann, Strobel, “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments”, American Economic Review LINK

  • Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt, The role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel LINK

Reciprocity, intentions

  • Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302.  In CLR. LINK

  • Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004), “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior 47, 268-298. LINK

  • Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher, “A theory of reciprocity” LINK

Altruism and warm glow

  • Andreoni and Miller (2002), “Giving according to GARP”: An experimental test the consistency of preferences for altruism, Econometrica, 737-753.  LINK

  • Andreoni, James, "Toward and Theory of Charitable Fundraising," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106 (1998), pp. 1186-1213. LINK

  • Harbough, W. ,1998, What do Donations buy? A model of philantropy based on prestige and warm-glow, JPubE, 269-284. LINK

  • Andreoni, James, "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989), 1147-1458. LINK

  • Andreoni, James, "Impure Altruism, and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," The Economic Journal 100 (1990), 464-477. LINK

  • Bénabou/Tirole, 2006, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, American Economic Review 96(5), 1652-1678.

Applications and Tests

  • Charness, G. and M. Rabin (2002), “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817-869. LINK

  • Morgan, J., K. Steiglitz, and G. Reis (2003), “The spite motive and equilibrium behaviour in auctions”, Contributions to Economic Analysis& Policy, 2(1), Art. 5. LINK

  • Benjamin, Daniel, “A Theory of Fairness in Labor Markets” LINK

Thursday April 12th - April 19th

Preferences over Goods & Gambles

  • Knetsch, Jack L., Richard H. Thaler, Daniel Kahneman, "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Winter, 1991), 193-206. LINK

  • Machina, Mark. “Choice under uncertainty: problems solved and unsolved.” JEP Summer 1987. LINK

  • Ellsberg, D. (1961), “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643-669. LINK

  • Tversky, A, and D. Kahneman (1991), “Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference dependent model”, QJE 106(4), 1039-1061. LINK

  • Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica 47, 263-291. LINK 

  • Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-324.

  • Prelec, Drazen, 1998, “The Probability Weighting function.” Econometrica, 66, 497 – 527.

  • Gonzales, R. and G. Wu (1999); “On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function”, Cognitive Psychology 38, 129-166. LINK

  • Wu, G. and R. Gonzales (1999), “Nonlinear Decision Weights in Choice under Uncertainty”, Management Science 45, 74-85. LINK

  • Wu, G. and M. Abdellaoui (2005), „Testing Prospect Theories Using Probability Tradeoff Consistency”, JRU 30(2), 107-131. LINK

  • Köszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2005), A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics November 2006, Vol. 121, No. 4: 1133-1165.
  • Camerer, C. (2000), “Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence From the Field”. LINK

    • Schmeidler, D. (1989), “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,” Econometrica 57, 571-587. LINK

    • Sarin, R. and P. Wakker (1992), “A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility,” Econometrica 60, 1255-1272. LINK

    • Chambers, R. and T. Melkonyan (2005), "The Precautionary Principle and Pareto Optimality in an Uncertain World". LINK

    • Gilboa,  I.  and D. Schmeidler (1989), "Maximin Expected utility with non-unique prior", Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 141-153.

April 24th - April 26th

Preferences over time – discounting

  • Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue (2002), “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 40, 351-401. LINK

  • Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1992): “Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 2, 573-597. LINK

  • Laibson, D. “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting”, QJE, v112 n2, May 1997, p.443-77. LINK

  • Laibson, D., Repetto, A., and Tobacman, J., “Self-control and saving for retirement”, BPEA, 1998 (1), p.91-196. LINK

  • Gul and Pesendorfer, “Self Control, Revealed Preference and Consumption Choice” LINK

  • O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), “Doing It Now or Later,” American Economic Review 89, 103-124.  In CLR. LINK

  • O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2000): “The Economics of Immediate Gratification,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 233-250. LINK

  • O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2001), “Choice and Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 121-160. LINK 

  • Fischer, Carolyn. “Read This Paper Later: Procrastination with Time-Consistent Preferences,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization v46, n3 (November 2001): 249-69 LINK

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Last updated: 03/9/2009