

TEXTS AND OVERVIEW PAPERS

Salanie, B., *The Economics of Contracts*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. (required)

Thomson, W. L. *A Guide for the Young Economist*, Cambridge : MIT Press, 2000 (required).

Chambers, R. G. and J. Quiggin. *Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency : The State-Contingent Approach*. Cambridge University Press, 2000. (recommended)

Laffont, J.-J. *Fundamentals of Public Economics*, MIT Press, 1988. (recommended)

Chambers, R.G., 2002. *Information, Incentives and the design of agricultural policies* Handbook of Agricultural Economics, B.L Gardner and G. C. Rausser (eds). North-Holland/Elsevier, New York.

Hidden Knowledge

The Basic Hidden Knowledge Model

Baron, D., and R. Myerson, 1982, Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs, *Econometrica*, 50, 911-930. ([LINK](#))

Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole, 1986, Using cost observations to regulate firms, *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, 614-641. ([LINK](#))

Lewis, Ware and Feenstra, 1989, Eliminating Price Supports: A Political Economy Perspective, *Journal of Public Economics*, 140, 159-185.

Chambers, R.G., 1992, On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms, *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 74, 646-54. ([LINK](#))

Smith, R.B.W. 1995. The Conservation Reserve Program as a Least-Cost Land Retirement Mechanism. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 77 : 93-105. ([LINK](#))

Bourgeon, J.-M. and R.G. Chambers. 2000, Stop and Go Agricultural Policies. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 82, 1-13. ([LINK](#))

Innes, R. Stop-and-Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 85 (2003) : 198-215. ([LINK](#))

Smith, R.B.W and J. Shogren. 2002. Voluntary Incentive Design for Endangered Species Protection. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 43 : 169-87. ([LINK](#))

Bourgeon, J.-M. and R.G. Chambers. Optimal Area-Yield Insurance Reconsidered. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 85 (2003) : 590-604 ([LINK](#))

Bourgeon, J.-M. and R. G. Chambers. Implementable Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing. Manuscript 2004.

Input versus output incentives

Maskin, E., and J. Riley, 1985, Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes, *Journal of Public Economics*, 28, 1-23.

Khalil, F. and J. Lawarree, 1995, Input versus Output Monitoring: Who is the Residual Claimant?, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 66, 139--157. ([LINK](#))

Bontems, P., and J.M. Bourgeon. 2000, Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments”, *Journal of Public Economics* 76 : 181-202. ([LINK](#))

Countervailing Incentives

Lewis, T. R. and D.E.M. Sappington, 1989, Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 49, 294-313.

_____. 1989, Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems. *American Economic Review*, 79, 69-84. ([LINK](#))

Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare, 1995, On Countervailing Incentives, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 66, 238-263. ([LINK](#))

Hueth, B.M. The Goals of US Agricultural Policy : A Mechanism Design Approach. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 82 : 14-24 ([LINK](#))

Adverse selection and externalities

Spulber, D., 1988, Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information, *Journal of Public Economics*, 35, 163-181.

Lewis, T. R., 1996, Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known, *Rand Journal of Economics*, 27, 819-847. ([LINK](#))

Hidden Action, Moral Hazard

Holstrom, B., 1979, Moral hazard and observability, *Bell Journal of Economics*, 10, 74-91. ([LINK](#))

Holstrom, B., 1982, Moral hazard in Teams, *Bell Journal of Economics*, 13, 324-340. ([LINK](#))

Segerson, K., 1988, Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 15, 87-98.

Xepapadeas, A., 1995, Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities, *Journal of Public Economics*, 56,485-498. ([LINK](#))

Chambers, R. and J. Quiggin, 1996, Non-Point-Source Pollution Regulation as a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem, *Journal of Public Economics*; 59, 95-116. ([LINK](#))

_____. “A State-Contingent Production Approach to Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to Point-Source Pollution Control *Journal of Public Economics* 70(1998): 441-472. ([LINK](#))

_____. Chapters 9, 10.

_____. 2004, Incentives and Standards in Agency Contracts. *Journal of Public Economic Theory* (forthcoming).

Tsoulouhas, T. and Vukina, T. 2001. Regulating Broiler Contracts : Tournaments vs. Fixed Standards. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 83 : 1062-73. ([LINK](#))