

Grad Development
A R E C : 869E
FALL 2007

Syllabus (Version 1: 08/30/07)

Instructor: Kenneth Leonard, 2116A Symons, 5-8589, email: kleonard@arec.umd.edu.

Time and Location: Tu Th 2:00-3:15 HZF 106

Office Hours: M F 1:00 - 2:00

Text: Bardhan, P. and Udry, C. (1999). *Development Microeconomics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford (On reserve in AREC library.)

Deaton, A. (1997). *The analysis of Household Surveys*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland (On reserve in AREC library.)

Bardhan, P., editor (1989). *The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions*. Oxford University Press, Oxford (On reserve in AREC library.)

Fafchamps, M. (2005). *Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence*. MIT press, Cambridge (On reserve in AREC library.)

Additional Material: There will be a series of assigned and additional readings. The additional readings are a rough list of references for those of you who have a particular interest in the subject. The required readings are either available on JSTOR or in the AREC library.

Grading: There will be about five homework assignments, a final and a paper. They will count toward the grade as follows.

Participation	20%
Homework	20%
Final	20%
Paper	40%

Description of the Course

This course is about development economics and focuses on microeconomics and empirical analysis. The course is primarily about research.

The typical class will have a lecture devoted to modeling or empirical issues appropriate to the topic, but will focus primarily on discussion of the papers assigned for that week. After the second lecture, each student will be assigned as a discussion leader for a particular week. Anticipate that you will lead the discussion twice in the semester. Leading the discussion will require you to read all the papers and prepare a opening series of points and follow up questions from a primary paper (to be indicated with ‡).

A paper will be required in this class. I expect the paper to be drafted as a grant proposal in which the student examines a body of work and proposes a new data set or theoretical model to add to this body of work. I expect the paper to be original, but it can (and should) build on papers that were assigned in the course.

Introduction and Econometric Philosophy

- Required Reading (August 30th):
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapter 1)
 - Meyer, B. D. (1995). Natural and quasi-experiments in economics. *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics*, 13(2):151–161. [Stable url](#)
 - Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(4):69–85. [Stable url](#)
 - DiNardo, J. and Tobias, J. L. (2001). Nonparametric density and regression estimation. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(4):11–28. [Stable url](#)
- Additional Reading:
 - Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (1999). Empirical strategies in labor economics. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors, *Handbook of Labor Economics*, volume 3A, chapter 23, pages 1277–1366. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam
 - Rosenzweig, M. and Wolpin, K. (2000). Natural ‘natural experiments’ in economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38(4):827–874. [JSTOR link](#)
 - Krugman, P. (1993). Toward a counter-counterrevolution in development theory. *Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1992*, pages 15–38
 - Ingham, B. (1993). The meaning of development: Interactions between “new” and “old” ideas. *World Development*, 21(11):1803–1821
 - Thorbecke, E. (1999). The evolution of the development doctrine and the role of foreign aid, 1950-2000. In Tarp, F., editor, *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*. Routledge, London
 - de Janvry, A., Murgai, R., and Sadoulet, E. (2002). Rural development and rural policy. In Raussier, G. and Just, R., editors, *Handbook of Agricultural Economics*. Elsevier, Amsterdam

Education Policy Case Study

This section is meant to be self contained in terms of theory and to open up a discussion about how development economics can and does address issues in the field through the study of one topic.

- Required Reading (September 4th and 6th):
 - Glewwe, P. (2002). Schools and skills in developing countries: Education policies and socioeconomic outcomes. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 40(2):436–482

- Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):795–813
 - Case, A. and Deaton, A. (1999). School inputs and educational outcomes in south africa. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(3):1047–84
 - Lleras-Muney, A. (2005). The relationship between education and adult mortality in the united states. *Review of Economic Studies*, 75(1):189–221. [Stable url](#)
 - ‡Angrist, J. and Lavy, V. (1999). Using maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic acheivement. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(2). [Stable url](#)
 - Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004). Worms: Identifying impacts on education and health in the presence of treatment externalities. *Econometrica*, 72(1):159–217. [Stable url](#)
 - Galiani, S., Gertler, P., and Schargrotsky, E. (2005). Water for life: The impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(1):83–120. [Stable URL](#)
 - Leonard, K. L. (forthcoming). Is patient satisfaction sensitive to changes in the quality of care? an exploitation of the hawthorne effect. *Journal of Health Economics*. [link to paper](#)
- Additional Reading:
 - Glewwe, P. (1999). School quality, student achievement, and fertility in developing countries. In Bledsoe, C. H., Casterline, J. B., Johson-Kuhn, J. A., and Haaga, J. G., editors, *Critical Perspectives on Schooling and Fertility in the Developing World*, chapter 5. National Academy Press, Washington, DC

Household Model

Standard Model

- Theory: (September 11th and 13th)
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapter 2, through section III)
 - Singh, I., Squire, L., and Strauss, J. (1986). Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: Chapters 1-2.
 - ‡Eswaran, M. and Kotwal, A. (1986). Access to capital and agrarian production organization. *Economic Journal*, 96(482):482–498. [JSTOR link](#)
- Empirical (September 18th and 20th):
 - Deaton, A. and Paxson, C. (1998). Economies of scale, household size, and the demand for food. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5):897–930. [JSTOR link](#)

- Benjamin, D. (1992). Household composition, labor markets, and labor demand: Testing for separation in agricultural household models. *Econometrica*, 60(2):287–322. JSTOR link
- ‡Jacoby, H. (1993). Shadow wages and peasant family labour supply: An econometric application to the Peruvian Sierra. *Review of Economic Studies*, 60(4):903–921. JSTOR link
- Additional Readings:
 - Udry, C. (1999). Efficiency and market structure: Testing for profit maximization in African agriculture. In Ranis and Raut, editors, *Trade, Growth and Development: Essays in Honor of T.N. Srinivasan*. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam
 - Fafchamps, M. (1992). Cash crop production, food price volatility, and rural market integration in the third world. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 74(1):90–99
 - Fafchamps, M. (1993). Sequential labor decisions under uncertainty: An estimable household model of west african farmers. *Econometrica*, 61:1173–98
 - Benjamin, D. (1995). Can unobserved land quality explain the inverse productivity relationship? *Journal of Development Economics*, 46(1):51–84
 - Feder, G., Lau, L., Lin, J., and Luo, X. (1990). The relationship between credit and productivity in Chinese agriculture: A microeconomic model of disequilibrium. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 72(2):1151–1157
 - de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., and Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant household behaviour with missing markets: Some paradoxes explained. *Economic Journal*, 101(409):1400–417

Household Composition and Economics, Intra-Household Allocations

- Theory (September 25th and 27th):
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapter 2, section IV)
 - Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach. *Journal of Human Resources*, 25(4):635–664. JSTOR link
 - Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. A. (1998). Efficient intra-household allocations: A general characterization and empirical tests. *Econometrica*, 66(6):1241–1278. JSTOR link
 - Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B., and Lacroix, G. (2002). Marriage market, divorce legislation and household labor supply. *Journal of Political Economy*, 110(1):37–72. link
 - Schultz, T. P. (1990). Testing the neoclassical model of family labor supply and fertility. *Journal of Human Resources*, 25(4):599–634. JSTOR link

- Deaton (33, Chapter 4.2)
- Empirical: (October 2rd and 4th)
 - ‡Udry, C. (1996). Gender, agricultural productivity and the theory of the household. *Journal of Political Economy*, 104(5):1010–46. JSTOR link
 - ‡Brown, P. H. (2002). Dowry and intrahousehold bargaining: Evidence from China. mimeo, University of Michigan. link
 - Duflo, E. (2000). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old age pension and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa. mimeo (available on-line), MIT
 - Case, A. and Deaton, A. (1998). Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa. *Economic Journal*, 108(450):1330–61. JSTOR link
 - Rangel, M. A. (2005). Alimony rights and intrahousehold allocation of resources: Evidence from Brazil. Technical report, University of Chicago. link to paper
- Additional Reading:
 - Becker, G. S. (1991). *A treatise on the Family: Enlarged Edition*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Chapters 3 and 4
 - Chiappori, P.-A. (1997). Introducing household production in collective models of labor supply. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1):191–209. JSTOR link
 - Rangel, M. A. and Thomas, D. (2006). Out of west africa: Evidence on the efficient allocation of resources within farm households. Technical report, University of Chicago. link to paper
 - Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. *Journal of Political Economy*, 100(3):437–467. JSTOR link
 - McElroy, M. B. (1990). The empirical content of nash-bargained household behavior. *Journal of Human Resources*, 25(4):559–83. JSTOR link
 - McElroy, M. B. and Horney, M. J. (1981). Nash–bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. *International Economic Review*, 22(2):333–349
 - Strauss, J. and Thomas, D. (1995). Human resources: Empirical modeling of household and family decisions. In Behrman, J. and Srinivasan, T., editors, *Handbook of Development Economics*. Elsevier Science: Section 7.4 (pp. 1993–2003)
 - Zhang, J. and Chan, W. (1999). Dowry and wife’s welfare: A theoretical and empirical analysis. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(4):786–808. JSTOR link
 - Lundberg, S. J., Pollak, R. A., and Wales, T. J. (1997). Do husbands and wives pool their resources? evidence from the united kingdom child benefit. *Journal of Human Resources*, 32(3):463–80

Markets and Institutions

Savings, Risk and Credit

- Theory: (October 9th and October 11th)
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapters 7 and 8)
 - Deaton (33, Chapter 6)
 - Case, A. (1995). Symposium on consumption smoothing in developing countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):81–82. [JSTOR link](#)
 - Townsend, R. M. (1995). Consumption insurance: An evaluation of risk-bearing schemes in low income economies. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):83–102. [JSTOR link](#)
 - Morduch, J. (1995). Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):103–114. [JSTOR link](#)
 - Besley, T. (1995). Nonmarket institutions for credit and risk sharing in low-income countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):115–127. [JSTOR link](#)
 - ‡Paxson, C. (1992). Using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income in Thailand. *American Economic Review*, 82(1):15–33. [JSTOR link](#)
- Empirical Analysis: (October 16th and 18th)
 - Rosenzweig, M. and Wolpin, K. (1993). Credit market constraints, consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries: Investments in bullocks in india. *Journal of Political Economy*, 101(2):223–244. [JSTOR link](#)
 - Lybbert, T. J., Barrett, C. B., Desta, S., and Coppock, D. L. (2004). Stochastic wealth dynamics and risk management among a poor population. *Economic Journal*, 114(498)
 - ‡Udry, C. (1994). Risk and insurance in a rural credit market: An empirical investigation in northern nigeria. *Review of Economic Studies*, 61(3):495–526. [JSTOR link](#)
- Institutions for Credit: (October 23rd and 25th)
 - Ghatak, M. and Guinnane, T. W. (1999). The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice. *Journal of Development Economics*, 60(1):195–228. [Science Direct Link](#)
 - Morduch, J. (1999). The microfinance promise. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 37(4):1569–1614. [JSTOR link](#)
 - ‡Coleman, B. (1999). The impact of group lending in northeast Thailand. *Journal of Development Economics*, 60(1):105–141. [Science Direct link](#)

- ‡Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2007b). Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment. mimeo, yale. available on-line
- ‡Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2007a). Expanding credit access: Using randomized supply decisions to estimate the impacts. mimeo, yale. available on-line
- Additional Reading:
 - Fafchamps, M., Udry, C., and Czukas, K. (1998). Drought and saving in west africa: Are livestock a buffer stock? *Journal of Development Economics*, 55(2):273–306. Science Direct link
 - Besley, T., Coate, S., and Loury, G. (1993). The economics of rotating savings and credit associations. *American Economic Review*, 83(4):792–810. JSTOR link

Information

- Required Reading: (October 30th and November 1st)
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapter 12)
 - Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M. (1995). Learning by doing and learning from others: Human capital and technical change in agriculture. *Journal of Political Economy*, 103(6):1176–1209. JSTOR link
 - ‡Conley, T. G. and Udry, C. (2005). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Working paper 817, Economic Growth Center, Yale
 - Grimard, F. (1997). Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from cote d’ivoire. *Journal of Development Economics*, 53(2):391–422. Science Direct link
 - Goldstein, M. (1999). Chop time, no friends: Intrahousehold and individual insurance mechanisms in southern ghana. mimeo (available on line), University of California at Berkeley
 - Leonard, K. L. (2007). Learning in health care: Evidence of learning about clinician quality in tanzania. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 55(3):531–555. link to paper
 - Leonard, K. L. Improving health outcomes by choosing better doctors: Evidence of social learning about doctor quality from rural tanzania. Technical report
- Additional Reading:
 - Kremer, M. (1993). The o-ring theory of economic development. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3):551–580
 - Basu, S. and Weil, D. N. (1998). Appropriate technology and growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(4)
 - Manski, C. F. (1993). Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem. *Review of Economic Studies*, 60(3):531–542

Institutions, Culture and Public Action

- (November 6th and 8th)
 - Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., and Weingast, B. R. (1990). The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. *Economics and Politics*, 2:1–23
 - Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2001). Government versus private ownership of public goods. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(4):1343–72. Stable URL
 - Barrett, C. (2005). Smallholder identities and social networks: The challenge of improving productivity and welfare. In Barrett, C., editor, *The social Economics of Poverty: On identities, communities, groups and networks*, chapter 9, pages 214–243. Routledge, London and New York
 - Abraham, A. and Platteau, J.-P. (2004). Participatory development: Where culture creeps in. In Rao, V. and Walton, M., editors, *Culture and Public Action*, chapter 10, pages 210–233. Stanford University Press, Stanford
 - Fafchamps (43, sections V, chapters 14-16)
- (Nov 13th and 15th)
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapter 17)
 - Platteau, J.-P. and Strzalecki, T. (2004). Collective action, heterogeneous loyalties and path dependence: Micro-evidence from senegal. *Journal of African Economies*, 13(3):417–445
 - Besley, T., Pande, R., Rahman, L., and Rao, V. (2004). The politics of public good provision: Evidence from indian local governments. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2(2/3):416–426. Stable URL
 - ‡Pande, R. (2003). Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities? theory and evidence from india. *American Economic Review*, 93(4):1132–51. Stable URL
 - ‡Banerjee, A., Mookherjee, D., Munshi, K., and Ray, D. (2001). Inequality, control rights and rent seeking: Sugar cooperatives in maharashtra. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(1):138–153. Stable URL
 - Khwaja, A. I. (2004). Is increasing community participation always a good thing? *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2(2):427–436. Stable URL
- Additional Reading
 - Bloch, F., Rao, V., and Desai, S. (2003). Wedding celebrations as conspicuous consumption. *Journal of Human Resources*, 39(3):675–695. Stable URL
 - Khwaja, A. I. (2001). Can good projects succeed in bad communities? collective action in the himalayas. mimeo, Harvard University
 - Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4):1243–84. Stable URL

- Runge, C. F. (1981). Common property externalities: Isolation, assurance, and resource depletion in a traditional grazing context. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 63(4):595–606. Stable URL
- Kremer, M. (1997). Why are worker cooperatives so rare? Working paper, NBER. link
- Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3):847–904
- Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. *Journal of Political Economy*, 94:691–719
- Hart, O. (1987). Incomplete contracts. In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., editors, *The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets*, volume 2, pages 752–759. Macmillan, New York

Labor and Land Tenancy

- Theory and Background (Nov 20th):
 - Bardhan and Udry (10, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (skim 5))
 - Bardhan (9, Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4)
 - Klein, P. G. (2000). New institutional economics. In Bouckaert, B. and Geest, G. D., editors, *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*, chapter 0530, pages 456–489. University of Ghent, Belgium. Available on-line (<http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/>): [Not in reader. Skim if you already familiar with NIE, read otherwise.]
 - ‡Murrell, P. (1983). The economics of sharing: A transactions cost analysis of contractual choice in farming. *Bell Journal of Economics*, 14:283–93. JSTOR link
- Empirical, applied work (Nov 27th and 29th):
 - ‡Eswaran, M. and Kotwal, A. (1985a). A theory of contractual structure in agriculture. *American Economic Review*, 75:352–367. JSTOR link
 - Foster, A. and Rosenzweig, M. (1994). A test for moral hazard in the labor market: Contractual arrangements, effort, and health. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 76(2):213–227. JSTOR link
 - Shaban, R. (1987). Testing between competing models of sharecropping. *Journal of Political Economy*, 95(5):893–920. JSTOR link
 - Lanjouw, J. O. (1999). Information and the operation of markets: Tests based on a general equilibrium model of land leasing in india. *Journal of Development Economics*, 60(2):497–527. Science Direct Link
- Additional Reading
 - Otsuka, K. and Hayami, Y. (1988). Theories of share tenancy: A critical survey. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 37(1):31–68. Stable url

- Bardhan, P. (1983). Labor-tying in a poor agrarian economy: A theoretical and empirical analysis. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 98(3):501–514. JSTOR link
- Eswaran, M. and Kotwal, A. (1985b). A theory of two-tier labor markets in agrarian economies. *American Economic Review*, 75(1):162–177. JSTOR link
- Leonard, K. L. (2003). African traditional healers and outcome-contingent contracts in health care. *Journal of Development Economics*, 71(1):1–22. (available at Science Direct)
- Leonard, K. L. (2006). The cost of imperfect agency: Evidence from rural cameroon. mimeo (available on-line), University of Maryland

Health

- Required Reading: (Skip this year)
 - Grossman, M. (1975). On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. *Journal of Political Economy*, 80:223–255. available on-line
 - Leonard, K. L. (2002). When states and markets fail: Asymmetric information and the role of ngos in african health care. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 22(1):61–80
- Additional Reading
 - Strauss, J. and Thomas, D. (1998). Health, nutrition, and economic development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 36(2):766–817. JSTOR link
 - Leonard, K. L., Mliga, G., and Haile Mariam, D. (2002). Bypassing health facilities in tanzania: Revealed preferences for observable and unobservable quality. *Journal of African Economies*, 11(4):441–471. (available on-line)

References

Online documents are available at www.arec.umd.edu/~kleonard/research.html

- [1] Abraham, A. and Platteau, J.-P. (2004). Participatory development: Where culture creeps in. In Rao, V. and Walton, M., editors, *Culture and Public Action*, chapter 10, pages 210–233. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- [2] Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4):1243–84. Stable URL.
- [3] Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3):847–904.
- [4] Angrist, J. and Lavy, V. (1999). Using maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(2). Stable url.
- [5] Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (1999). Empirical strategies in labor economics. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors, *Handbook of Labor Economics*, volume 3A, chapter 23, pages 1277–1366. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.
- [6] Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(4):69–85. Stable url.
- [7] Banerjee, A., Mookherjee, D., Munshi, K., and Ray, D. (2001). Inequality, control rights and rent seeking: Sugar cooperatives in maharashtra. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(1):138–153. Stable URL.
- [8] Bardhan, P. (1983). Labor-tying in a poor agrarian economy: A theoretical and empirical analysis. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 98(3):501–514. JSTOR link.
- [9] Bardhan, P., editor (1989). *The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- [10] Bardhan, P. and Udry, C. (1999). *Development Microeconomics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- [11] Barrett, C. (2005). Smallholder identities and social networks: The challenge of improving productivity and welfare. In Barrett, C., editor, *The social Economics of Poverty: On identities, communities, groups and networks*, chapter 9, pages 214–243. Routledge, London and New York.
- [12] Basu, S. and Weil, D. N. (1998). Appropriate technology and growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(4).
- [13] Becker, G. S. (1991). *A treatise on the Family: Enlarged Edition*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- [14] Benjamin, D. (1992). Household composition, labor markets, and labor demand: Testing for separation in agricultural household models. *Econometrica*, 60(2):287–322. JSTOR link.
- [15] Benjamin, D. (1995). Can unobserved land quality explain the inverse productivity relationship? *Journal of Development Economics*, 46(1):51–84.

- [16] Besley, T. (1995). Nonmarket institutions for credit and risk sharing in low-income countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):115–127. JSTOR link.
- [17] Besley, T., Coate, S., and Loury, G. (1993). The economics of rotating savings and credit associations. *American Economic Review*, 83(4):792–810. JSTOR link.
- [18] Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2001). Government versus private ownership of public goods. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(4):1343–72. Stable URL.
- [19] Besley, T., Pande, R., Rahman, L., and Rao, V. (2004). The politics of public good provision: Evidence from indian local governments. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2(2/3):416–426. Stable URL.
- [20] Bloch, F., Rao, V., and Desai, S. (2003). Wedding celebrations as conspicuous consumption. *Journal of Human Resources*, 39(3):675–695. Stable URL.
- [21] Brown, P. H. (2002). Dowry and intrahousehold bargaining: Evidence from China. mimeo, University of Michigan. link.
- [22] Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. A. (1998). Efficient intra-household allocations: A general characterization and empirical tests. *Econometrica*, 66(6):1241–1278. JSTOR link.
- [23] Case, A. (1995). Symposium on consumption smoothing in developing countries. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(3):81–82. JSTOR link.
- [24] Case, A. and Deaton, A. (1998). Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa. *Economic Journal*, 108(450):1330–61. JSTOR link.
- [25] Case, A. and Deaton, A. (1999). School inputs and educational outcomes in south africa. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(3):1047–84.
- [26] Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. *Journal of Political Economy*, 100(3):437–467. JSTOR link.
- [27] Chiappori, P.-A. (1997). Introducing household production in collective models of labor supply. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1):191–209. JSTOR link.
- [28] Chiappori, P.-A., Fortin, B., and Lacroix, G. (2002). Marriage market, divorce legislation and household labor supply. *Journal of Political Economy*, 110(1):37–72. link.
- [29] Coleman, B. (1999). The impact of group lending in northeast Thailand. *Journal of Development Economics*, 60(1):105–141. Science Direct link.
- [30] Conley, T. G. and Udry, C. (2005). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. Working paper 817, Economic Growth Center, Yale.
- [31] de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., and Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant household behaviour with missing markets: Some paradoxes explained. *Economic Journal*, 101(409):1400–417.
- [32] de Janvry, A., Murgai, R., and Sadoulet, E. (2002). Rural development and rural policy. In Rausser, G. and Just, R., editors, *Handbook of Agricultural Economics*. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
- [33] Deaton, A. (1997). *The analysis of Household Surveys*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland.
- [34] Deaton, A. and Paxson, C. (1998). Economies of scale, household size, and the demand

- for food. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(5):897–930. JSTOR link.
- [35] DiNardo, J. and Tobias, J. L. (2001). Nonparametric density and regression estimation. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(4):11–28. Stable url.
- [36] Duflo, E. (2000). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old age pension and intra-household allocation in South Africa. mimeo (available on-line), MIT.
- [37] Duflo, E. (2001). Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):795–813.
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